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Human Rights and Powerlessness:
Pathologies of Choice and Substance
MAKAU MUTUAt
The human rights corpus is defined by a variety of
pathologies-both of choice and substance-that are limited
and limiting.1 Many of these pathologies arise not only from
the internal logic of the corpus, but also the tactical and
strategic choices that its proponents have made over the
past sixty years. One of these is the equation of the
containment of state despotism with the attainment of
human dignity. This "hands off' logic is an integral, if not
the essential, signature of the corpus. Without going into a
discussion about the critique of rights-indeterminacy,
elasticity, and their double-edge-suffice it to note that the
human rights project basically polices the space between
the state and the individual, and not between individual
citizens. As put by Karl Klare, the dominant understanding
of "the human rights project is to erect barriers between the
individual and the state, so as to protect human autonomy
and self-determination from being violated or crushed by
governmental power."' 2 Yet, there is nothing intrinsic about
human beings that requires only their protection from the
state and not the asymmetries of power between them.
This definition of the nature of human dignity, whichdraws heavily from liberalism and political democratic
theory, has an atrophied understanding of the role of the
t Dean, SUNY Distinguished Professor, Floyd H. and Hilda L. Hurst Faculty
Scholar, and Director of the Human Rights Center at the University at Buffalo
Law School, and Chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission.
1. Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589,
601 (1996).
2. Karl E. Mare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections of
1989, 25 U. B.C. L. REV. 69, 97 (1991).
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state. Admittedly, the thick welfare state is an attempt to
emphasize a more robust view of liberalism. In human
rights doctrine, this fuller iteration of liberalism is
ostensibly contained in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").
However, the flaccidity, impotency, and vagueness of the
ICESCR are evidence of the bias of the corpus to the more
limited vision. 3 As is the case with political democracy, the
human rights regime appears to be more concerned with
certain forms of human powerlessness, and not others. This
certainly has been the practice of human rights by the most
influential human rights NGOs and institutions. In fact,
there has never been a major human rights NGO in the
West that focuses on economic, social, and cultural rights.
The problem is not simply one of orientation, but a
fundamental philosophical commitment by movement
scholars and activists to vindicate "core" political and civil
rights over a normative articulation that would disrupt
vested class interests and require a different relationship
between the state and citizens and between citizens. It
seems to have been convenient for human rights NGOs to
shy away from questions of economic powerlessness during
the Cold War because charities and Western governments
frowned upon them. If so, it was a bias that was more than
strategic-it was ideological.
These limitations are inherent in liberalism itself. That
is why the human rights corpus, which is an expression of
liberalism, has conceptual and normative problems with
respect to powerlessness. The first limitation is simply one
of the idiom in which the rights discourse is formulated.
The language of rights, which is central to liberalism, is
fraught with limitations which could be detrimental to the
project of transforming deeply distorted societies. Inherent
in the language of rights are indeterminacy, elasticity, and
the double-edged nature of the rights discourse. All these
characteristics open the rights language to malleability,
misuse by malignant social elements, and make them a tool
in the hands of those opposed to reform. South Africa is a
case in point where a right-based revolution has been
unable to fundamentally transform deeply embedded social
dysfunction and the perverse legacy of Apartheid. The
3. David Beetham, What Future for Economic and Social Rights?, 43 POL.
STuD. 41, 41 (1995).
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choice of the rights idiom as the medium of choice to
unravel the ravages of Apartheid has been less than
successful in spite of continued economic growth.4
Another problem of the liberal tradition, which has
been inherited by the human rights movement, is its
unrelenting focus on individualism. This arises from
liberalism's focus on formal equality and abstract
autonomy. The human rights corpus views the individual as
the center of the moral universe, and therefore denigrates
communities, collectives, and group rights. This is one of
the biggest problems of the human rights movement. This
is a particularly serious problem in areas of the world
where group and community rights are deeply embedded
both in the cultures of the peoples, and exacerbated by the
multinational nature of the post-colonial state. 5 The concept
of self-determination, for example, cannot simply be
understood as an external problem: it must, of necessity, be
understood as encompassing the many nations within a
given post-colonial state. In reality, this means that
individual rights of citizens within the state must be
addressed in the context of group rights. Thus, group rights
or the rights of peoples become important entitlements if
the state is to gain the loyalties of its diverse citizens.
I do not deny that individualism is a necessity for any
constitutional democracy, but I reject the idea that we can,
or should, stop there. That would be a stunted
understanding of rights. Indeed, for rights to make sense,
one has to go beyond the individual and address group
identities in the political and economic framework of the
state. Even in South Africa, for example, one of the states
with an avowedly liberal interpretation of the rights
language, there was an accommodation of group rights to
language, culture, and other forms of identity. 6 One way
political democracy deals with the question of multiple
4. Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits
of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 63, 68-70 (1997).
5. Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339,
340-42 (1995).
6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
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nations within one state is to grant autonomy regimes for
groups or to devolve powers through forms of federalism. 7
Secondly, the human rights movement's primary
grounding and bias towards civil and political rights-and
the impotence and vagueness of economic, social, and
cultural rights-is one of its major weaknesses. Political
democracy alone-without at least a strong welfare state or
a social democracy-appears to be insufficient to address
the vagaries of globalization. The bias towards civil and
political rights favors vested narrow class interests and
kleptocracies which are entrenched in the bureaucratic,
political, and business sectors of society and represent
interests that are not inclined to challenge the economic
powerlessness of the majority. Yet the human rights
movement assumes the naturalness of the market and the
inevitability of employer/employee, capitalist/worker, and
subordinated labor relations. It seeks the regulation of
these relationships, but not their fundamental
reformulation.
By failing to interrogate and wrestle with economic and
political philosophies and systems, the human rights
movement indirectly sanctions capitalism and free markets.
Importantly, the human rights corpus wrongly equates the
containment of state despotism with the achievement of
human dignity so that it seeks the construction of a political
society in which political tyranny-not economic tyranny-
is circumscribed. Thus, it seeks to create a society in which
political tyranny is circumscribed, or minimized. But in so
doing, it sidesteps economic powerlessness-the very
condition that must be addressed if human dignity is to be
recovered. Clearly, political freedoms are important, but as
South Africa has demonstrated, these are of limited utility
in the struggle to empower populations and reduce the
illegitimacy of the state. It is an illusion to think of
powerlessness and human indignity in purely political
terms, as the human rights movement does, and to
prescribe political democracy and the human rights
doctrine as a panacea.
One of the more interesting pathologies of the human
rights texts is their avoidance or reluctance to employ a
7. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over
Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1539 (1991).
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certain vocabulary to describe powerlessness. What is
striking about the key human rights documents is their
failure to use some of the most important terms of the
modern era to describe and formulate societal responses. In
terms of power or lack of it, and the consequent violations,
there are no more important words than "capitalism,"
"imperialism," "colonialism," and "apartheid," among
others. Yet, the UDHR-the single most important human
rights document-sanctions the right to private property.8
How plausible is a document that calls itself a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" 9 if
it does not recognize that at its writing the bulk of the
global South was under European colonial rule and subject
to the vilest economic exploitation by the merchants of
capital? It is difficult to believe that such an omission was
an oversight. At the time, there was an epochal contest
between socialism and capitalism. This too appears to have
been conveniently overlooked in the basic texts. Or was it?
My submission is that there was a surreptitious recognition
of secularism, capitalism, and political democracy through
the guarantee of the rights that yield a society framed by
those systems.
The failure to wrestle with the types of economic
philosophies and systems that would best protect and
nurture a fuller definition of human dignity has had a
devastating effect on the human rights movement. From
the start, the movement and its founders did not see
themselves as charged with the responsibility to address
economic powerlessness. Even though the UDHR addresses
some economic, social, and cultural rights, it is clear that
they are an afterthought and marginalized within the
document. Only the last six articles at the end are devoted
to these rights. But even so, the rights are not scripted in a
way that directly confronts powerlessness and exploitation.
The rights relating to work and labor assume, for example,
the fact and legitimacy of capitalism and free markets. 10
Working people are therefore expected to fight for their
rights within those systems and structures. The same logic
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 17, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
9. Id. pmbl.
10. Id. arts. 23-25.
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is the basis for the ICESCR that presumably grants rights
within a system of free enterprise that protects workers
from the worst excesses of global capitalism. In this regard,
the ICESCR should be understood as a normative project
for a thick welfare state within a market economy. It is a
document that seeks to mitigate the harshness of
capitalism and give it a more human face.
This failure of imagination and acquiescence to a free
market vision of political democracy has robbed the human
rights corpus and the movement of the impetus to think
beyond markets and systems of exploitation that produce
ugly social structures. Fundamentally, the human rights
corpus has no philosophy on money and whether, for
example, the creation of a Bill Gates would itself be a
violation of human rights norms. In political society, an
absolute dictator would be impermissible under human
rights norms and contemporary understandings of political
democracy. Analogously, Bill Gates is the market
equivalent of the political dictator, although that is not how
he is understood in a political democracy or by the human
rights corpus. In fact, Gates is a celebrated and venerated
individual, the pinnacle of success in society. Yet, the
existence of his economic empire, which he personally holds,
is a radical perversion of any egalitarian or equitable notion
of human dignity. The multiplication of Gates by the
number of other obscenely rich individuals and corporate
interests yields a graphic over-concentration of power in the
hands of a tiny majority. It is very difficult, if not
impossible, to articulate a plausible argument of how a
system that permits such vast differences among citizens
does not violate basic notions of human dignity. In an era of
globalization, where capital knows no borders and is
virtually unaccountable, questions of economic justice and
fairness should obsess the human rights corpus and the
movement. It is not enough to decry, as human rights
NGOs do, the worst excesses of globalization, or the most
shocking practices such as sweatshops and cruel labor and
slave-like conditions of work. The corpus must develop a
defensible normative project to address economic and social
arrangements and systems. Rather than treat the
government simply as the regulator of markets-as is the
case in a political democracy-human rights norms must do
more.
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Perhaps one way of addressing this pathology is to
reassess the place and role of the individual in society
relative to the greater public good of the community and the
environment. One of the problems here is the elevation of
the individual and his placement above society. This
runaway notion of individualism, which is a central tenet to
liberalism, has retarded the capacity of human rights
thinkers to moderate selfishness with community interests.
In other words, the individual should be placed within the
society and constructed in a way that he does not
overwhelm his fellow beings or the society itself. There is
nothing natural, inevitable, or frozen in time about how the
individual ought to be constructed. Nor should a
reconstruction of the individual necessarily wreak havoc
with more defensible notions of popular sovereignty,
individual autonomy, and political freedom. But this is an
exercise that will require thinkers to look beyond
Eurocentric lenses to build a more universal vision of the
individual. The individual need not necessarily be placed at
the center of the moral universe. Otherwise, the vices and
abominations of globalization are bound to overcome the
human race.
Finally, the human rights corpus and movement focus
too much on process and rights at the expense of politics
and substance. This distinction is both a product of the
rights idiom in which the corpus is expressed and tactical
and strategic choices by movement activists. The movement
sees itself as vindicating rights that are coded in positive
law. In contrast, politics is partisan, sloppy, and lacking in
neutrality. By casting themselves as doing the work of the
law, movement activists perpetuate the myth of objectivity.
In fact, during the Cold War, the human rights community
in the West deliberately distanced itself from the overt
promoters of democracy in the global South and the Soviet
bloc." Instead, human rights activists presented
themselves as a community interested in process and the
rule of law, not politics or the ideological project of
democracy. Partly, this was a reaction to the detriment of
being seen as supporting the crusade of the West,
particularly under President Ronald Reagan, of rooting out
communism in favor of pro-Western market or political
11. Thomas Carothers, Democracy and Human Rights: Policy Allies or
Rivals?, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 109, 117.
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democracies. Even so, the human rights movement in the
West relentlessly attacked Soviet bloc states and Third
World countries for their closed or authoritarian political
systems. In this, they worked with pro-democracy human
rights advocates in those countries. Objectively, human
rights groups were pursuing an agenda very similar to that
of the Reagan Administration. Rather than play such a
game, human rights groups should only advocate
consequentialist and outcome-based agendas instead of
hiding behind process and rights. Such a full disclosure
approach would demystify human rights and offer a clearer
basis for critical thought.
There is little doubt that in the last half century, the
world has seen substantial progress in addressing state
tyranny. Part of this success is clearly attributable to the
human rights movement and its marketing of the liberal
constitution and the values of political democracy. But the
successful march against state despotism has been
conducted as a cloak and dagger contest-pushing a value
system without directly stating its normative and political
identity. This is unfortunate and need not have been
necessarily so, even if one were to allow for the tactical and
strategic choices that the movement had to make. Lost in
the translation was an opportunity to think more robustly
about human rights as a political project and then question
its broader prescriptions for the society of the future.
This diffidence has been limiting to the human rights
movement. Why hide the ball? Everything should be placed on
the open table so that we can openly debate questions of
power and powerlessness, and how to reformulate the human
rights corpus to address pressing crises. Perhaps we will
decide that human rights is not the right language for this
struggle. Perhaps it is. In any case, we will never know until
we take off the veil. What is clear today is that the movement
will lose its relevance unless it can address-seriously and as
a priority-human powerlessness in all its dimensions.
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